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In this paper, a two-country leader-follower model with imperfect asset 
substitution is used to derive the optimal sterilization coefficients for two-
country flexible and fixed exchange rate regimes. It is found that, in general, 
incomplete sterilization is optimal. However, both the origin and the type of 
macroeconomic shocks the economies experience are important in 
determining the appropriate degree of sterilization. We also find that 
sterilization policies have spill-over effects (strategic complements) in both 
cases. Thus, in a competitive policy-making environment, greater sterilization 
by one country leads to greater sterilization by the other country. Further, the 
impact of increasing capital market integration is examined in particular. We 
show that greater integration compounds this problem, leading to full 
sterilization as the optimal outcome under perfect capital mobility.  
 
I. Introduction  
 
Sterilization of foreign exchange operations is a significant 
feature of the monetary policies of the industrial countries. Indeed, 
routine sterilization is a well-known practice of the Federal Reserve 
Bank, the Bank of Japan, and the Bundesbank. Further, sterilization of 
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other country interventions has also been practiced, in particular by 
Germany and France. Empirical studies confirm this for most countries, 
yielding estimates of a sterilization coefficient greater than zero but 
less than one, or full sterilization [Mastropasqua et al. (1988)]. Studies 
on the Bundesbank indicate near full, or not significantly different from 
full sterilization [Pasula (1994); von Hagen (1989); Obstfeld (1983)].  
 
Herring and Marston (1977) have shown that though 
sterilization of foreign exchange operations can afford a degree of 
monetary autonomy for a country, it has important consequences for 
the stability of reserve flows. In addition, within an exchange rate 
agreement, sterilized intervention prevents the correction of domestic 
monetary policy and interest rate alignment necessary for stability of 
the system. Mastropasqua et al. (1988, p. 283) noted this problem 
and characterized EMS member policy making with "somewhat 
excessive reliance on sterilized interventions, on occasion with the aim 
of rigidly defending a particular exchange rate level, and insufficiently 
supportive use of domestic monetary instruments (interest rates)." 
Therefore the appropriate degree of sterilization is an important 
policymaking issue.  
 
Though optimal foreign exchange intervention policy has 
received a great deal of attention in the professional literature 
[prominent articles include Gros and Lane (1992); Turnovsky (1985a, 
b); Black (1985); Benavie (1983); Canzoneri (1982); Boyer (1978)], 
the issue of appropriate sterilization policies is still somewhat 
unsettled. This is mainly because most traditional theoretical models 
assume perfect capital mobility and, therefore, sterilized foreign 
exchange intervention leaves the home country money supply 
unchanged and is ineffective.  
 
As a result, one principal area of investigation centers on the 
channels by which sterilized intervention may affect the exchange 
market. There are two common approaches in which fully-sterilized 
intervention can be effective. One is an announcement approach in 
which there is asymmetric information or incomplete markets. Here, 
the central bank has superior information about economic 
fundamentals and signals this information to the public through its 
policy actions. The second approach is a portfolio approach, where 
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assets are imperfect substitutes internationally, and sterilized 
intervention is effective by altering the relative supplies of these 
assets. Bordo and Schwartz (1991), and Dominguez and Frankel 
(1994) have provided summaries of this and related literature.  
 
Another area of research, which is usually based on a portfolio 
approach, allows for variable sterilization and determines the optimal 
degree of sterilization and foreign exchange intervention. Examples 
here include Benavie and Froyen (1992), Natividad and Stone (1990), 
Kenen (1982), and Marston (1980). Only Marston has examined 
sterilization in a two-country setting, but this analysis does not include 
the real sector. Therefore, what is missing from the literature is a full 
analysis of the interaction of sterilization and intervention policies 
across countries. This paper attempts to fill this void.  
 
In this paper, the optimal degree of sterilization is derived in a 
two-country framework, in which the policymakers attempt to 
minimize both the variance of home output (or home output prices) 
and the variance of consumer price inflation. The interaction of 
sterilization and intervention policies is then examined in this context. 
The theoretical model employed here allows for variable sterilization 
and is derived from asset models such as Canzoneri (1982) and 
Benavie (1983). As bonds are considered imperfect substitutes, even 
fully-sterilized intervention can affect the exchange rate.  
 
The optimal sterilization and intervention settings are 
determined for two cases: a leader-intervention and a leader-fixed-
rate case. As in Lane (1989), a unique Nash solution does not exist for 
the selection of intervention by both countries. Thus, the leader 
country chooses its rule for intervention and the optimal degree of 
sterilization is determined, based on this rule. It is found that, in 
general, incomplete sterilization is optimal. However, both the origin 
and the type of macroeconomic shocks the economies experience are 
important in determining the appropriate degree of sterilization. We 
also find that sterilization policies have spill-over effects (strategic 
complements) in both cases. Thus, in a competitive policy making 
environment, greater sterilization by one country leads to greater 
sterilization by the other country, generating increased reserves 
instability. Further, the impact of increasing capital market integration 
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is examined in particular. We show that greater integration compounds 
this, leading to full sterilization under perfect capital mobility.  
 
The following section presents and describes a two-country, 
variable sterilization model and provides solutions. In Section III, the 
interaction of sterilization and intervention policies is examined within 
this model. In Section IV, the optimal solutions are derived for a 
flexible rate example and in Section V, for a fixed rate example. 
Section VI provides a summary and conclusion.  
 
II. A Model of Interdependent Economies  
 
Our results are derived from a model of two identical economies 
with bonds which are imperfect substitutes internationally. The model 
is typical of the literature, and the reader is referred to the small-
economy examples of Benavie (1983) and Natividad and Stone 
(1990), and the multiple-country example of Canzoneri (1982).  
 
Model Equations  
 
The following eight-equation structure depicts the home and 
foreign markets for goods, money and bonds:  
 
Consumer Prices  
𝑐𝑡 ≡ 𝛼𝑝𝑡 + (1 − 𝛼)(𝑝𝑡
∗ + 𝑒𝑡);  𝛼 >
1
2
,  
(1)  
𝑐𝑡
∗ ≡ 𝛼𝑝𝑡
∗ + (1 − 𝛼)(𝑝𝑡 − 𝑒𝑡), 
(1*)  
Aggregate Demand  
 
𝛾𝑡 =  𝑎𝑙(𝑝𝑡
∗  +  𝑒𝑡  − 𝑃𝑡)  −  𝑎2[𝑟𝑡  −  (𝐸𝑡𝑐𝑡+1  −  𝑐𝑡)]  + 𝜂𝑡;  𝑎1.2  
>  0, 
(2)  
 
𝛾𝑡
∗ =  𝑎1(𝑝𝑡
∗  +  𝑒𝑡  − 𝑝𝑡)  − 𝑎2[𝑟𝑡
∗  −  (𝐸𝑡𝑐𝑡+1
∗  −  𝑐𝑡
∗)]  + 𝜂𝑡
∗ 
(2*) 
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Aggregate Supply  
 
𝑦𝑡  =  𝑎3(𝑝𝑡  −  𝐸𝑡−1 − 𝑝𝑡)  + 𝜌𝑡;  𝑎3  ≥  0, 
(3)  
𝑦𝑡
∗  =  𝑎3(𝑝𝑡
∗  −  𝐸𝑡−1𝑝𝑡
∗)  + 𝜌𝑡
∗ 
(3*) 
 
Money Demand  
 
𝑚𝑡  − 𝑝𝑡  =  𝑦𝑡  −  𝑎4𝑟𝑡  +  𝜇𝑡;  𝑎4 ≥  𝑂, 
(4)  
𝑚𝑡
∗ − 𝑝𝑡
∗  =  𝑦𝑡
∗  −  𝑎4𝑟𝑡
∗  +  𝜇𝑡
∗ 
(4*)  
 
Bond Demand  
 
𝑏𝑡 = 𝑔1𝑟𝑡 − 𝑔2[𝑟𝑡
∗ + (𝐸𝑡𝑒𝑡+1 − 𝑒𝑡)] + 𝑔3(𝑦𝑡 + 𝑦𝑡
∗) + 𝑔4𝜉𝑡
− 𝜇𝑡;  𝑔1,2,3,4 > 0,  
(5)  
𝑏𝑡
∗  =  𝑔1𝑟𝑡
∗ − 𝑔2[𝑟𝑡 −  (𝐸𝑡𝑒𝑡+ 1  −  𝑒𝑡)]  + 𝑔3(𝑦𝑡  +  𝑦𝑡
∗)  − 𝑔4𝜉𝑡  
−  𝜇𝑡
∗ 
(5*)  
 
Money Supply Rules  
 
𝑚𝑡  =  𝑚𝑡−1 +  Δ𝑓𝑡  −  Δ𝑓𝑡
∗  +  Δ𝑑𝑡 
(6)  
𝑚𝑡
∗ =  𝑚𝑡−1
∗ +  Δ𝑓𝑡
∗  −  ∆𝑓𝑡  +  ∆𝑑𝑡
∗ 
(6*)  
∆𝑓𝑡 = −𝜃1(𝑒𝑡 + 𝐸𝑡−1𝑒𝑡), 
(7)  
∆𝑓𝑡
∗ = 𝜃1
∗(𝑒𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−1𝑒𝑡), 
(7*)  
∆𝑑𝑡 = −𝜃2(∆𝑓𝑡 − ∆𝑓𝑡
∗), 
(8)  
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∆𝑑𝑡
∗ = −𝜃2
∗(∆𝑓𝑡
∗ − ∆𝑓𝑡), 
(8*)  
where home (foreign) variables and policy parameters are non-asterisk 
(asterisk), with  
 
𝑦𝑡 ≡ log of real output,  
𝑝𝑡 ≡ log of home output price level,  
𝑒𝑡 ≡ the log of the exchange rate, measured as units of domestic 
currency per unit of foreign currency,  
𝑚𝑡 ≡ log of the nominal money stock,  
𝑟𝑡 ≡ log of home output price level,  
𝑓𝑡 ≡ log of the stock of foreign exchange reserves valued at a 
constant rate and denominated in a common accounting 
standard,  
𝑑𝑡 ≡ log of domestic credit denominated in a common 
accounting standard,  
𝐸𝑡+𝑗 ≡ expectations operator, conditional on information dated 
time 𝑡 + 𝑗,  
𝜂𝑡 ≡ home output demand disturbance, with 𝐸(𝜂𝑡 = 0) and 
𝐸(𝜂𝑡)
2 = 𝜎𝜂
2,  
𝜌𝑡 ≡ home output supply disturbance, with 𝐸(𝜌𝑡 = 0) and 𝐸(𝜌𝑡)
2 =
𝜎𝜌
2,  
𝜇𝑡 ≡ exogenous home bond to home money portfolio shift, with 
𝐸(𝜇𝑡 = 0) and 𝐸(𝜇𝑡)
2 = 𝜎𝜇
2, 
𝜉𝑡 ≡ exogenous foreign bond to home bond portfolio shift, with 
𝐸(𝜉𝑡 = 0) and 𝐸(𝜉𝑡)
2 = 𝜎𝜉
2,  
𝑏𝑡 ≡ flow demand for home bonds, denominated in a common 
accounting standard.  
 
All variables are normalized around trend, and stochastic disturbances 
are assumed to be independent and uncorrelated.  
 
Equations (1) and (1*) define the consumer price index for each 
economy, where a represents the weight on consumption of home 
goods. Equations (2) and (2*) are the equilibrium conditions for home 
output demand, where demand is positively related to home output 
price competitiveness and negatively related to the home real interest 
rate, computed by the home CPI. Equations (3) and (3*) are typical 
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price-misperception aggregate supply functions. These supply 
functions could be based on consumer prices as opposed to home 
output price, adding feedback channels (via the exchange rate and 
foreign prices) and greater algebraic detail, but without changing our 
general conclusions. Therefore, for comparison with the literature cited 
in the introduction and at the beginning of this section, only home 
output price is included in the supply function.  
 
Equations (4) and (4*) are the demand functions for real money 
balances in each economy. The income elasticity of money demand is 
assumed to be unity as a mere simplification which has no substantive 
impact on our results. Although the anticipated non-home interest rate 
could be included in equations (4) and (4*), this would add an 
additional feedback channel and greatly complicate the already 
burdensome algebra without affecting our general conclusions. The 
term represents an exogenous shift in home asset preferences, when 
positive, from home bonds to home money.  
 
Equations (5) and (5*) are the demand flow functions for home 
and foreign bonds, where home (foreign) bond demand depends 
positively on the home (foreign) yield and negatively on the expected 
foreign (home) yield. Both home and foreign bonds are normal goods 
in that there is a positive relationship between demand and income. 
When positive, 𝜉𝑡 represents an exogenous portfolio shift from foreign 
bonds to home bonds. Branson and Henderson (1984) have provided a 
detailed explanation of the derivation of, and the assumptions inherent 
in, asset demand functions such as these. As a further assumption 
here, it is assumed that the interest elasticity of bond demand is 
greater than the interest elasticity of money demand. This assumption 
precludes an ambiguous exchange rate effect of money demand 
shocks.  
 
Finally, equations (6) through (8*) represent the money supply 
rules. In equation (6), the home money supply is a function of 
systematic intervention by home and foreign authorities in the foreign 
exchange market and home sterilization, as reflected by changes in 
foreign reserves and domestic credit. If 𝜃1 >  0, a depreciation of the 
home currency [(𝑒𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡𝑒𝑡−1 ) > 0 ] leads the domestic authority to sell 
foreign reserves and the foreign authority to buy foreign reserves, 
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e.g., leaning with the wind. Further, 𝜃1 = ∞ represents a fixed or 
pegged exchange rate regime; 𝜃1 >  0, a flexible regime; and 0 < |𝜃1| <
∞, a managed regime.  
 
The exchange market intervention envisioned here is that in 
which the monetary authority intervenes simply by buying or selling 
the other country's currency (in effect, exchanging reserves).1 The 
intervention action of the foreign (home) authority is not necessarily 
immediately and fully sterilized by the home (foreign) authority, and 
thus affects the home (foreign) money supply. As an example, 
consider the case where 𝜃1 =  0, 𝜃1
∗ > 0. If the home currency 
appreciates (𝑒𝑡 decreases), the foreign authority sells foreign reserves 
(∆𝑓𝑡
∗ < 0). As shown in equations (6) and (6*), the foreign money 
supply decreases and the home money supply increases. 
Consequently, the money supplies are linearly dependent. The 
implication of this for optimal intervention solutions is addressed in 
greater detail later in the paper.  
 
In equations (8) and (8*), domestic credit is affected by the 
degree of sterilization, determined by the offset coefficients 𝜃2 and 𝜃2
∗. 
If 𝜃2 = 1, exchange market intervention is fully sterilized. If 𝜃2 = 0, no 
sterilization is conducted and the home money supply responds to 
unanticipated exchange rate movements to a degree determined by 
the intervention parameters 𝜃1 and 𝜃1
∗. Finally if 0 < 𝜃2 < 1, the 
exchange market intervention is partially sterilized. Note that the 
exchange market intervention conducted by the foreign authority is 
not assumed to be automatically sterilized. Hence, intervention by the 
foreign authority affects the home money supply, and the home 
authority can use sterilization operations as an instrument even when 
the home authority does not conduct exchange market intervention.  
 
Obviously, domestic credit could be conditioned upon a host of 
other variables, increasing the number of instruments available to the 
monetary authorities. However, the objectives of the monetary 
authorities could be increased as well. We choose here to focus 
specifically on exchange rate intervention and sterilization.  
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Equilibrium Conditions and Solutions  
 
For each country, the current account surplus less capital 
outflows equals changes in official reserves. Aggregating the balance 
of payments equations and ignoring interest rate effects on trade 
balances [as in Benavie (1983)], the external equilibrium condition, or 
difference between changes in official reserves, can be expressed as:  
 
∆𝑓𝑡 − ∆𝑓𝑡
∗ = ℎ1(𝑝𝑡
∗ + 𝑒𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡) + ℎ2(𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡
∗) − ℎ3(𝐸𝑡𝑒𝑡+1 − 𝑒𝑡) + 𝜉𝑡
− 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡
∗, 
(9)  
 
where ℎ1 ≡ 2𝑎1, ℎ2 ≡ 2(𝑔1 + 𝑔2), ℎ3 ≡ 4𝑔2, and, for mere convenience, 
𝑔4 is assumed equal to one half. Note that if uncovered interest parity 
were to hold, ℎ2 and ℎ3 would approach infinity in value. In the bulk of 
our analysis, it is assumed that there is some degree of capital 
mobility, but uncovered interest parity does not hold.  
 
The five equilibrium conditions can now be used to solve for the 
five endogenous variables, 𝑟𝑡,  𝑟𝑡
∗,  𝑝𝑡,  𝑝𝑡
∗, and 𝑒𝑡. Setting home (foreign) 
money demand equal to home (foreign) money supply (the LM 
equation) yields expressions for 𝑟𝑡( 𝑟𝑡
∗). These expressions are 
substituted into the remaining three equilibrium conditions for the 
home goods market, foreign goods market, and the external 
equilibrium condition given in equation (9). Solutions are proposed for 
the remaining three endogenous variables:  
 
𝑝𝑡 = 𝜋10 + 𝜋11𝜂𝑡 + 𝜋11
∗ 𝜂𝑡
∗ + 𝜋12𝜌𝑡 + 𝜋12
∗ 𝜌𝑡
∗ + 𝜋13𝜇𝑡 + 𝜋13
∗ 𝜇𝑡
∗ +
𝜋14𝜉𝑡 + 𝜋15𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝜋15
∗ 𝑚𝑡−1
∗ , 
(10)  
𝑝𝑡
∗ = 𝜋20 + 𝜋21𝜂𝑡 + 𝜋21
∗ 𝜂𝑡
∗ + 𝜋22𝜌𝑡 + 𝜋22
∗ 𝜌𝑡
∗ + 𝜋23𝜇𝑡 + 𝜋23
∗ 𝜇𝑡
∗ +
𝜋24𝜉𝑡 + 𝜇25𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝜋25
∗ 𝑚𝑡−1
∗ , 
(11)  
𝑒𝑡 = 𝜇30 + 𝜋31𝜂𝑡 + 𝜋31
∗ 𝜂𝑡
∗ + 𝜋32𝜌𝑡 + 𝜋32
∗ 𝜌𝑡
∗ + 𝜋33𝜇𝑡 + 𝜋33
∗ 𝜇𝑡
∗ +
𝜋34𝜉𝑡 + 𝜋35𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝜋35
∗ 𝑚𝑡−1
∗ . 
(12)  
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Explicit and implicit solutions for the coefficients are provided in the 
Appendix. The exchange rate solution is provided below to facilitate 
the presentation of policy outcomes.  
 
Exchange Rate Solution  
 
After solving for the ’s above, the exchange rate solution can be 
expressed as:  
 
𝑒𝑡 = [𝛽1(𝜂𝑡 − 𝜂𝑡
∗) − 𝛿1(𝜇𝑡 − 𝜇𝑡
∗) − 𝛿2𝜉𝑡 − 𝛿3(𝜌𝑡 − 𝜌𝑡
∗)]Δ−1 + 𝑚𝑡−1
− 𝑚𝑡−1
∗ , 
(13)  
where  
 
Δ ≡ −𝛿2{𝛽2 − [2 − 𝛽3(1 − 𝜃2) − 𝛽3(1 − 𝜃2
∗)](𝜃1 + 𝜃1
∗)} +
𝛽1[2𝛽5 − 𝛽6(1 − 𝜃2)(𝜃1 + 𝜃1
∗) − 𝛽6(1 − 𝜃2
∗)(𝜃1 + 𝜃1
∗)], 
 
and 𝛽ˊ𝑠 the 𝛿 ˊ𝑠and are identities provided in the Appendix.  
 
Examining the domestic shock terms, we find that a positive 
domestic goods demand shock has an ambiguous effect on the 
exchange rate. The increased goods demand, and thus relative price 
effect, leads to a home currency depreciation, yet the effect of a 
higher interest rate leads to a home currency appreciation. If it is 
assumed that there is a relatively high degree of capital mobility, then 
𝛽1 < 0, and a positive goods demand shock causes a home currency 
appreciation. Given the assumption that the interest elasticity of bond 
demand exceeds the interest elasticity of money demand, a positive 
money demand shock causes a home currency appreciation through 
both the goods and portfolio channel. A positive portfolio shock, 
representing an exogenous shift to home bonds from foreign bonds, 
causes the home currency to appreciate. Finally, a positive supply 
shock causes the home currency to appreciate through a 
competitiveness effect (falling home prices make home output more 
competitive), to depreciate through an income effect (increased 
demand for foreign output), and to appreciate through a portfolio 
effect (similar to a money demand shock).  
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As 𝜃1 and 𝜃1
∗ increase (greater degree of systematic 
intervention), Δ increases, meaning that the exchange rate is less 
responsive to the shocks described above. Further, it is apparent in 
this solution that foreign exchange intervention affects the exchange 
rate, even if the intervention action is fully sterilized (𝜃2 and 𝜃2
∗ = 1).  
 
III. Policy Objectives and Instrument Interaction  
 
The optimal exchange intervention and sterilization actions of 
the two policymakers are determined from the minimization of 
individual loss functions defined as the equally weighted average of 
the variance of output around its full information level and of the 
variance of unanticipated consumer price inflation. Thus as in 
Tumovsky et al. (1988), the home loss function is defined as [using 
equation (3)]:  
 
𝐿 =
1
2
Var[𝑎3(𝑝𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−1𝑝𝑡) + 𝜌𝑡] +
1
2
Var(𝑐𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−1𝑐𝑡), 
(14)  
and the foreign loss function as [using equation (3*)]:  
 
𝐿∗ =
1
2
Var[𝑎3(𝑝𝑡
∗ − 𝐸𝑡−1𝑝𝑡
∗) + 𝜌𝑡
∗] +
1
2
Var(𝑐𝑡
∗ − 𝐸𝑡−1𝑐𝑡
∗) 
(14*)  
In many articles on optimal foreign exchange intervention, it is 
assumed that the home authority automatically and fully sterilizes 
foreign intervention and does not sterilize own intervention, and vice 
versa. This setup creates asymmetric money supply rules, allowing for 
a nash approach. However, if it is not assumed that this asymmetry 
automatically occurs, the money supplies and intervention coefficients 
are linearly dependent and a nash equilibrium does not exist. This 
issue is discussed and proved in Lane (1989).  
 
Therefore, the model employed here, as that in Lane (1989), 
does not have a unique Nash solution for both intervention 
coefficients. There are an infinite number of Nash equilibrium 
combinations of intervention coefficients (𝜃1 and 𝜃1
∗) that yield the 
same level of optimal intervention. Thus, it is impossible to derive 
unique values for both intervention coefficients. Therefore, we 
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examine two cases which determine the intervention rule for one 
authority (as this "ties down" the value of one of the intervention 
coefficients) and highlight the role of sterilization policies in non-
cooperative contexts. Both cases use a Stackelberg approach [see 
Canzoneri and Henderson (1992), Chapter 2; Lane (1989)], with the 
home policymaker regarded as the leader (perhaps as the reserve 
currency country), choosing its intervention rule (𝜃1) first. Once the 
intervention regime is chosen by the leader country, unique 
sterilization coefficients can be determined.  
 
The first case models that where the home country determines 
its optimal degree of foreign exchange intervention (making 
intervention on the part of the foreign authority moot and thus 𝜃1
∗ =
0), leaving the home and foreign authorities to choose their optimal 
degree of sterilization. The second example considers the case where 
the home authority pegs the exchange rate (𝜃1 = ∞). Again, the home 
and foreign authority determine their sterilization actions in a non-
cooperative fashion.  
 
IV. Case 1: Optimal Intervention Leader  
 
Initially, we consider the case where the home authority is the 
leader, determining its optimal degree of intervention by minimizing 
the loss function given in equation (14). The home and foreign 
authorities then determine their respective optimal degree of 
sterilization, considering the exchange intervention of the home 
authority, again minimizing the loss functions in (14) and (14*). The 
home authority, therefore, has two instruments with which to minimize 
the two-part loss function. The foreign authority, in a sense, borrows 
the intervention conducted by the home authority and fine tunes it 
with its own sterilization action.  
 
Policy Interaction  
 
Before computing the optimal settings for 𝜃1, 𝜃2, and 𝜃2
∗, it is 
worthwhile to consider the home response functions. In doing so, the 
strategic interaction of the home and foreign policy instruments can be 
determined. Using the taxonomy provided by Lane (1990), policies can 
be classified as strategic substitutes or strategic complements. Lane 
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described foreign exchange intervention policies as strategic 
substitutes if intervention by one country leads to less intervention by 
the other country. As Lane pointed out, this case can lead to multiple 
equilibria, but the alternatives cannot be Pareto ranked. If foreign 
exchange policies are strategic complements, then intervention by one 
country results in greater intervention by the other country. This case 
leads to multiple equilibria which can possibly be Pareto ranked, and 
may provide for Pareto improving coordination of policies.  
 
Marston (1980), using a two-country model of the financial 
sector, examined the role of sterilization policies in modifying balances 
of payments disturbances. Marston showed that sterilization by the 
(home) country conducting the intervention, reduces the variance of 
the home interest rate but increases the flow of foreign reserve flows. 
Further, sterilization by the foreign country also increases the reserve 
flows of the home country. This indirectly implies that home 
sterilization and home intervention are complementary policies, and 
foreign sterilization and home intervention are complementary polices. 
The direct relationship between foreign sterilization and home 
sterilization was not examined by Marston.  
 
In the analysis here, the optimal policy response functions of 
the home authority result from the minimization of the home loss 
function, [equation (14)]. They indicate the general relationships 
among the three instruments. The response functions are:  
 
𝜃2 = 1 − (1 − 𝜃2
∗)
(1+𝑎3
2)Κ2
(1+𝑎3
2)Κ1+(𝛽4−𝛽5)Κ3
, 
(15)  
and  
𝜃1 = (1 − 𝜃2
∗)−1
(1+𝑎3
2)Κ1+(𝛽4−𝛽5)𝛿3Κ3
𝛽6Κ3
, 
(16)  
where  
𝛫1 ≡ {𝛿4𝛿3𝜎𝜌
2 − (1 − 𝛼)𝑎3[𝛽1𝜎𝜂∗
2 + 𝑎2𝑎4
−1𝛿1𝜎𝜇∗
2 + 𝛿3(1 +
𝑎2𝑎4
−1)𝜎𝜌∗
2  ]}, 
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𝛫2 ≡ {𝛿5𝛿3𝜎𝜌
2
− (1 − 𝛼)𝑎3[𝛽1𝜎𝜂
2 + 𝑎2𝑎4
−1𝛿1𝜎𝜇
2 + 𝛿3(1 + 𝑎2𝑎4
−1)𝜎𝜌
2 ]} 
and  
 
𝛫3 ≡ 𝛿3{(2𝛼 − 1)𝜎𝜌
2 + 𝑎3
2[𝛼𝜎𝜌
2 − (1 − 𝛼)𝜎𝜌∗
2 ]} 
 
Equations (15) and (16) indicate a positive relationship among 
instruments (𝜕𝜃2 ∕ 𝜕𝜃2
∗ > 0 and 𝜕𝜃1 ∕ 𝜕𝜃2
∗ > 0). Hence, home 
sterilization policies and foreign sterilization policies are strategic 
complements, because increasing sterilization by the foreign authority 
generates greater sterilization by the home authority. To understand 
this relationship, consider the case where the home central bank is 
intervening by buying the foreign currency. This has the indirect effect 
of decreasing the foreign money supply and increasing the home 
money supply. To offset this, the foreign sterilization operation 
expands the foreign money supply and the home sterilization operation 
contracts the home money supply. However, because the foreign 
sterilization operation is inflationary for both economies, the home 
central bank must contract the home money supply by a greater 
extent to offset the foreign policy action and vice versa. 
 
Foreign sterilization and home intervention are strategic 
complements as well; increasing sterilization by the foreign authority 
leads to greater intervention by the home authority. This outcome 
follows the logic presented above. As the foreign country offsets 
central bank purchases of the foreign currency, it undertakes an 
expansionary or inflationary policy. This, in turn, puts additional 
downward pressure on the foreign currency, necessitating greater 
purchases by the home authority.  
 
Optimal Policy  
 
In this section, the optimal policy solutions are derived for the 
three policy instruments. After substitution of the foreign reaction 
function into the home loss function, equation (14), the optimal setting 
for home intervention is:  
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𝜃1 =
[𝛿7𝛽6−𝛿6(𝛽4−𝛽5)]𝛫3+𝛿6(1+𝑎3
2)(𝛫1+𝛫2)+𝛽6(1−𝛼)𝑎3(1+𝑎3
2)𝛫4
2𝛿2𝛽6𝛫3
, 
(17)  
and for home sterilization  
 
𝜃2 = 1 −
2𝛿2(1+𝑎3
2)𝛫2
𝛿6(1+𝑎3
2)(𝛫1+𝛫2)+𝛽6(1−𝛼)𝑎3(1+𝑎3
2)𝛫4+[𝛿7𝛽6+𝛿6(𝛽4+𝛽5)]𝛫3
, 
(18)  
where  
 
𝛫4 ≡ [𝛽1
2(𝜎𝜂
2 + 𝜎𝜂∗
2 ) + 𝛿3
2(𝜎𝜌
2 + 𝜎𝜌∗
2 ) + 𝛿1
2(𝜎𝜇
2 + 𝜎𝜇∗
2 ) + 𝛿2
2𝜎𝜉
2].  
 
Substituting these solutions into the foreign loss function results in the 
optimal solution for the foreign authority's sterilization coefficient, 
which is:  
 
𝜃2
∗ = 1 −
2𝛿2[(1+𝑎3
2)𝛫1+(𝛽4−𝛽5)𝛫3]
𝛿6(1+𝑎3
2)(𝛫1+𝛫2)+𝛽6(1−𝛼)𝑎3(1+𝑎3
2)𝛫4+[𝛿7𝛽6−𝛿6(𝛽4−𝛽5)]𝛫3
. 
(19)  
 
The solutions above indicate that, in general, a managed float with 
incomplete sterilization is optimal.2 By examining each shock 
individually, the source of policy tension in this model can be 
highlighted. The optimal outcomes for goods demand, money demand, 
and portfolio shocks are provided in Table 1 below and discussed 
subsequently. Supply shocks are detailed individually.  
 
For goods demand, money demand, and portfolio shocks, the 
optimal intervention solution is a peg, i.e.,𝜃1 = ∞ , and the sterilization 
solutions are symmetric across countries. For an exogenous portfolio 
shift, full sterilization by both authorities is optimal. A shift in bond 
demand is met with a like shift in relative money supplies through the 
intervention action. Fully sterilizing this intervention eliminates 
domestic and foreign price innovations [𝑝𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−1𝑝𝑡 and 𝑝𝑡
∗ − 𝐸𝑡−1𝑝𝑡
∗].  
 
For goods demand, or money demand shocks originating from 
abroad, full sterilization is optimal. With the exchange rate pegged, full 
sterilization by the home authority makes the home price innovation 
equivalent to the foreign price innovation. By adjusting the foreign 
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money supply (less than full sterilization by the foreign authority), the 
foreign authority eliminates, simultaneously, foreign and domestic 
price innovations. If the shock originates domestically, less than full 
sterilization by the home authority is optimal. The pegged exchange 
rate and complete sterilization by the foreign policymaker eliminates 
exchange rate innovations and makes foreign price innovations 
equivalent to home price innovations. Allowing the home money 
supply to adjust (less than complete sterilization) simultaneously 
eliminates home and foreign price innovations.  
 
Even though an asymmetric policymaking environment exists, 
symmetric policy outcomes result for the shocks examined so far. This 
is because, without supply shocks, there are three objectives, home 
and foreign price innovations and the exchange rate innovation. There 
are also three instruments, 𝜃1, 𝜃2, and 𝜃2
∗. With the exchange rate 
pegged, each authority should eliminate the inflationary or deflationary 
consequences of shocks which originate in the domestic economy 
through appropriate adjustment of their money supplies. In other 
words, if the shock originates domestically, the domestic authority 
should allow the domestic money supply to adjust, i.e., not fully 
sterilize.  
 
As noted earlier in the description of equation (9), ℎ2 and 
ℎ3 increase with greater substitutability of bonds, approaching unity in 
the limit. As a result, for a goods demand shock, sterilization increases 
also. Not as apparent, optimal sterilization increases for a money 
shock as well. As seen in equations (4) and (5), the money shock 
represents a shift from domestic bonds to domestic money. In the 
limit, the optimal solution for the case of a money shock is identical to 
that of the goods demand shock. Therefore, we find that increasing 
capital market integration can, in a competitive policymaking 
environment, lead to policies which generate greater reserve flows.  
 
Turning to the supply shocks, we see that they are the sources 
of tension and asymmetry in the analysis here. The intervention 
solution for the foreign supply shock is 𝜃1 = [ℎ3𝑎4 + ℎ2 + 𝑎2(ℎ3 − ℎ2)] ∕
2𝑎2𝑎3(𝑎4 + 1). This outcome illustrates how supply shocks complicate 
policymaking by making an exchange rate peg suboptimal. There are 
now three objectives in the loss function of the home authority, home 
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and foreign price innovations, and exchange rate innovations, and four 
in the loss function of the foreign authority, foreign output innovations, 
home and foreign price innovations, and exchange rate innovations. 
There remain, however, only three instruments. Foreign exchange 
intervention can no longer be directed at exchange rate innovations 
alone and, thus, a pegged exchange rate is suboptimal.  
 
It is, however, still optimal for the home authority to completely 
sterilize, 𝜃2 = 1, its foreign exchange intervention. However, the 
foreign authority now finds it suboptimal to use sterilization actions 
solely to smooth foreign price innovations, as foreign output will still 
change in light of the supply shock. The optimal degree of sterilization 
which results is 𝜃2
∗ = 1 − 2[(1 + 2𝑎3
2)(𝑎4 + 𝑎2) + 𝑎2𝑎3(𝑎4 + 1)][ℎ3𝑎4 +
ℎ2 + 𝑎2(ℎ3 − ℎ2)]
−1. For these outcomes, greater bond substitutability 
increases the optimal degree of intervention, driving 𝜃1 to infinity 
(pegged rate) in the limit. Further, greater substitutability increases 
the optimal degree of foreign sterilization, reaching complete 
sterilization in the limit 𝜃2
∗ = 1.  
 
The optimal solutions in light of a foreign supply shock are more 
complicated and given in equations (20)—(22). The optimal 
intervention solution is:  
 
𝜃1 =
𝛫5
2𝑎2(𝑎4+1)[(2𝛼−1)+𝛼𝑎3
2]
, 
(20)  
where  
 
𝛫5 ≡ 𝑎4[𝑎3
2𝛼 + (2𝛼 − 1)][𝛽6(𝛽2 − 𝛽1) + 𝛽3(𝛽5 − 𝛽4)] +
𝑎4𝛿6(1 + 𝑎3
2) + (1 + 𝑎3
2)𝑎3(1 − 𝛼)[𝛽6ℎ2 − 𝛽3(𝑎4 + 𝑎2)]. 
 
Equation (20) shows that the home authority allows partial adjustment 
for this shock as well. The solution for the optimal degree of home 
sterilization is:  
 
𝜃2 = 1 −
2(1 + 𝑎3
2)[𝑎1𝑎4 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑎2]
𝛫5
 
(21)  
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Economics and Business, Vol 49, No. 1 (January 1997): pg. 43-60. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission 
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this 
article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier. 
18 
 
 
and for foreign sterilization,  
 
𝜃2
∗ = 1 −
2[𝛽4+𝑎2
2𝛽5+(2𝑎3
2+1)𝛼(𝛽4−𝛽5)]
𝛫5
. 
(22)  
 
When the supply shock originates in the home economy, the home 
authority uses its exchange rate intervention and sterilization 
operations to export the effects of the supply shock. The foreign 
authority must respond by adjusting its money supply (less than full 
sterilization). Increasing substitutability of bonds again increases the 
optimal degree of intervention, leading to a pegged rate (𝜃1 = ∞) with 
perfect substitutability. Also, the optimal degree of sterilization 
increases with increased substitutability of bonds, with full sterilization 
optimal in the limit (𝜃2 and 𝜃2
∗ = 1). 
 
This leader-intervention case reveals the competitive 
relationship of sterilization policies and intervention policies. Increased 
sterilization by the foreign authority generates greater sterilization and 
intervention by the home authority. As demonstrated by Marston 
(1980), this relationship between sterilization and intervention can 
cause greater variability of reserves. The positive relationship between 
sterilization policies is established here and adds even further to the 
problem of reserve instability.  
 
It is also shown here that increased international substitutability 
of assets compounds this problem. With perfect capital mobility, ℎ2and 
ℎ3 approach infinity, as explained below equation (9). As a result, the 
loss functions described in equations (14) and (14*) reduce to three 
elements, home price innovations, foreign price innovations, and 
exchange rate innovations. The loss functions of the two authorities 
are minimized when the exchange rate is pegged, and money supplies 
are (trend) stationary, which comes about with full sterilization. The 
case where the leader pegs the exchange rate is examined next.  
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V. Case 2: Fixed Exchange Rate Leader  
 
In this second case, it is assumed that the home authority elects 
to peg the exchange rate. Therefore, 𝜃1 = ∞. The optimal sterilization 
coefficients of the home and foreign authorities are determined, taking 
𝜃1 = ∞ as given, in a competitive manner. The reaction functions 
which result in this case display the same relationship between 
instruments as in the first case; that is, home and foreign sterilization 
operations are strategic complements. Because of space consideration 
they are not provided here.  
 
The optimal sterilization coefficients for the home and foreign 
authorities are:  
 
𝜃2 = 1 − 2 
𝛿2{(2𝛼 − 1)(𝛼 + 𝑎3
2)𝛫6 + 𝑎3𝛿3[(𝛼𝛿5 + 𝑎3
2𝛽5)𝜎𝜌∗
2 + (𝛼𝛿4 + 𝑎3
2𝛽4)𝜎𝜌
2]}
(𝛼 + 𝑎3
2){(2𝛼 − 1)[𝛽6𝛫4 − 𝛿6(𝛫6 + 𝛫7)] + 𝛿2𝛿6𝑎3𝛿3(𝜎𝜌2 + 𝜎𝜌∗
2 )}
 
(23)  
and  
 
𝜃2 = 1 − 2  
𝛿2{(2𝛼 − 1)(𝛼 + 𝑎3
2)𝛫7 + 𝑎3𝛿3[(𝛼𝛿5 + 𝑎3
2𝛽5)𝜎𝜌
2 + (𝛼𝛿4 + 𝑎3
2𝛽4)𝜎𝜌∗
2 ]}
(𝛼 + 𝑎3
2){(2𝛼 − 1)[𝛽6𝛫4 − 𝛿6(𝛫6 + 𝛫7)] + 𝛿2𝛿6𝑎3𝛿3(𝜎𝜌2 + 𝜎𝜌∗
2 )}
, 
(24)  
where  
 
𝛫6 = 𝛽1𝜎𝜂
2 + 𝑎2𝑎4
−1𝛿1𝜎𝜇
2 + 𝛿3(1 + 𝑎2𝑎4
−1)𝜎𝜌
2 
  
and  
 
𝛫7 = 𝛽1𝜎𝜂∗
2 + 𝑎2𝑎4
−1𝛿1𝜎𝜇∗
2 + 𝛿3(1 + 𝑎2𝑎4
−1)𝜎𝜌∗
2
. 
 
As in the previous case, the solutions above show, in general, optimal 
sterilization to be less than complete. Considering the outcome for 
specific shocks, we find the solutions for goods demand, money 
demand and portfolio shocks to be identical to the previous case. This 
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outcome is logical because, for these particular shocks, it was optimal 
for the home authority to peg the exchange rate as it is here.  
 
The supply shocks, however, yield quite different solutions. For 
a home country supply shock, the optimal sterilization coefficients are:  
 
𝜃2 =
2𝑎4[(2𝛼−1)(𝑎2+𝑎4)+𝛿2𝑎4𝑎3]
(2𝛼−1)[𝑎2(1+𝑎4)ℎ2−(ℎ2+ℎ3𝑎4)(𝑎2+𝑎4)]+𝛿6𝑎4
2𝑎3
, 
(25)  
 
and  
 
𝜃2
∗ =
2𝛿2𝑎4𝑎3
(2𝛼−1)[𝑎2(1+𝑎4)ℎ2−(ℎ2+ℎ3𝑎4)(𝑎2+𝑎4)]+𝛿6𝑎4
2𝑎3
. 
(26)  
 
 
The solution for 𝜃2 is different than in the first case as the exchange 
rate is being pegged by the home authority as opposed to managed; 
nonetheless, the home authority finds partial sterilization to be 
optimal. Likewise, less than full sterilization is optimal for the foreign 
authority. As in the previous outcomes, the optimal degree of home 
sterilization increases with greater international substitutability of 
assets, approaching unity in the limit.  
 
For a foreign country supply shock, the optimal degree of 
sterilization coefficients for the home and foreign authorities are 
symmetric to those above, contrasting the competitive case with the 
leadership case described previously.3 As in the previous case, though, 
less than full sterilization is, in general, optimal.  
 
VI. Summary and Conclusion  
 
In this paper, the optimal sterilization procedures have been 
determined for two-country leadership flexible and leadership fixed 
exchange-rate regimes. These solutions indicate that, in general, less 
than full sterilization is optimal. It also has been shown that 
sterilization policies are strategic complements between the two 
countries and strategic complements with intervention policies. 
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Therefore, in a competitive policymaking environment, greater use of 
sterilization leads to both increased sterilization by the other authority 
and greater exchange intervention. The result is increased reserve 
flows and possibly explosive reserve flows [Mastropasqua et al. (1988, 
p. 270)]. Greater substitutability of assets internationally generates 
further sterilization and, therefore, compounds this problem.  
 
The somewhat common practice of automatic and complete 
sterilization of own and other country interventions should therefore 
be questioned, even in an environment where sterilized intervention is 
(theoretically) effective. Given that sterilization policies are strategic 
complements, it may be possible to coordinate sterilization policies and 
avoid excessive reserve variability. This issue is, however, beyond the 
scope of analysis presented here.  
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Notes  
 
1. The various ways in which exchange market intervention is conducted and 
financed is detailed in Humpage (1994). What is envisioned here is 
intervention along the lines of the example in Batten and Ott (1984).  
2. Given the symmetry assumed in the model and loss functions examined 
here, if the home authority were to surrender intervention to the foreign 
authority, the optimal instrument settings which would result would be 
symmetric to those of the first case.  
3. Solutions for a pegged-rate regime, where the home authority acts as a 
leader in determining the optimal degree of sterilization, are available from 
the author upon request.  
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Appendix  
Model Solutions  
 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝜋10 + 𝜋11𝜂𝑡 + 𝜋11
∗ 𝜂𝑡
∗ + 𝜋12𝜌𝑡 + 𝜋12
∗ 𝜌𝑡
∗ + 𝜋13𝜇𝑡 + 𝜋13
∗ 𝜇𝑡
∗
+ 𝜋14𝜉𝑡 + 𝜋15𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝜋15
∗ 𝑚𝑡−1
∗  
 
𝑃𝑡
∗ = 𝜋20 + 𝜋21𝜂𝑡 + 𝜋21
∗ 𝜂𝑡
∗ + 𝜋22𝜌𝑡 + 𝜋22
∗ 𝜌𝑡
∗ + 𝜋23𝜇𝑡 + 𝜋23𝜇𝑡
∗
+ 𝜋24𝜉𝑡 + 𝜋25𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝜋25
∗ 𝑚𝑡−1
∗  
 
𝑒𝑡 = 𝜋30 + 𝜋31𝜂𝑡 + 𝜋31
∗ 𝜂𝑡
∗ + 𝜋32𝜌𝑡 + 𝜋32
∗ 𝜌𝑡
∗ + 𝜋33𝜇𝑡 + 𝜋33
∗ 𝜇𝑡
∗
+ 𝜋34𝜉𝑡 + 𝜋35𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝜋35
∗ 𝑚𝑡−1
∗  
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𝜋10 = 𝜋20 = 𝜋30 = 0 
 
𝜋15 = 𝜋25
∗ = 𝜋35 = 1, 𝜋25 = 𝜋15
∗ = 0, 𝜋35
∗ = 1, 
 
𝜋16 = 𝜋26
∗ = 𝜋36 = 1, 𝜋26 = 𝜋16
∗ = 1, 𝜋36
∗ = 1, 
 
𝜋11 = {𝛽4[𝛽2 + 2 − (2 − 𝜃2 − 𝜃2
∗)(𝜃1 + 𝜃1
∗)]
− 𝛽1[2 − 𝛽3(1 − 𝜃2) − 𝛽3(1 − 𝜃2
∗)](𝜃1 + 𝜃1
∗)}∆−1 
 
𝜋11
∗ = {𝛽5[𝛽2 + 2 − (2 − 𝜃2 − 𝜃2
∗)(𝜃1 + 𝜃1
∗)]
− 𝛽1[2 − 𝛽3(1 − 𝜃2) − 𝛽3(1 − 𝜃2
∗)](𝜃1 + 𝜃1
∗)}∆−1 
 
𝜋12 = −𝑎2𝑎4
−1𝜋11 − (1 − ℎ2𝑎4
−1)𝜋13 
 
𝜋12
∗ = −𝑎2𝑎4
−1𝜋11
∗ − (1 − ℎ2𝑎4
−1)𝜋13 
 
𝜋13 = −{(𝛽4 − 𝛽5) − [𝛽4(1 − 𝜃2) − 𝛽5(1 − 𝜃2
∗)](𝜃1 + 𝜃1
∗)}∆−1 
 
𝜋14 = −(1 + 𝑎2𝑎4
−1)𝜋11 
 
𝜋14
∗ = −(1 + 𝑎2𝑎4
−1)𝜋11
∗  
 
𝜋21 = 𝜋11
∗  
 
𝜋21
∗ = 𝜋11 
 
𝜋22 = −𝑎2𝑎4
−1𝜋21 − (1 − ℎ2𝑎4
−1)𝜋13 
 
𝜋22
∗ = −𝑎2𝑎4
−1𝜋21
∗ − (1 − ℎ2𝑎4
−1)𝜋13 
 
𝜋23 = −{(𝛽5 − 𝛽4) − [𝛽5(1 − 𝜃2) − 𝛽4(1 − 𝜃2
∗)](𝜃1 + 𝜃1
∗)}∆−1 
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𝜋24 = −(1 + 𝑎2𝑎4
−1)𝜋21 
 
𝜋24
∗ = −(1 + 𝑎2𝑎4
−1)𝜋21
∗  
 
𝜋31 = −𝜋31
∗ = 𝛽1∆
−1 
 
𝜋32 = −𝜋32
∗ = −(1 + 𝑎2𝑎4
−1)𝜋31 + ℎ2𝑎4
−1𝜋33 
 
𝜋33 = −𝜋33
∗ = −𝑎2𝑎4
−1𝜋31 + (1 − ℎ2𝑎4
−1)𝜋33 
 
𝜋34 = −(𝛽4 + 𝛽5)∆
−1 
 
∆≡ −𝛿2{𝛽2 − [2 − 𝛽3(1 − 𝜃2) − 𝛽3(1 − 𝜃2
∗)](𝜃1 + 𝜃1
∗)}
+ 𝛽1[2𝛽5 − 𝛽6(1 − 𝜃2)(𝜃1 + 𝜃1
∗)
− 𝛽6(1 − 𝜃2
∗)(𝜃1 + 𝜃1
∗)] 
 
Identities  
 
𝛽1 ≡ ℎ1 − ℎ2𝑎4
−1(1 + 𝑎3) 
 
𝛽2 ≡ ℎ1 + ℎ3 
 
𝛽3 ≡ ℎ2𝑎4
−1 + ℎ3 
 
𝛽4 ≡ 𝑎3 + 𝑎1 + 𝑎2𝑎4
−1(1 + 𝑎3) + 𝛼𝑎2 
 
𝛽5 ≡ 𝑎1 − (1 − 𝛼)𝑎2 
 
𝛽6 ≡ 𝑎2(1 + 𝑎4
−1) 
 
𝛽7 ≡ (𝛽4
2 − 𝛽5
2) 
 
𝛿1 ≡ 𝛽1𝑎2𝑎4
−1 − (𝛽4 + 𝛽5)(1 − ℎ2𝑎4
−1) 
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𝛿2 ≡ 𝛽4 + 𝛽5 
 
𝛿3 ≡ 𝛽1(1 + 𝑎2𝑎4
−1) + (𝛽4 + 𝛽5)ℎ2𝑎4
−1 
 
𝛿4 ≡ 𝛼𝛽4 + (1 − 𝛼)𝛽5 
 
𝛿5 ≡ (1 − 𝛼)𝛽4 + 𝛼𝛽5 
 
𝛿6 ≡ 𝛽1𝛽6 + 𝛿2𝛽3 
 
𝛿7 ≡ 𝛽2𝛿2 − 2𝛽1𝛽5 
 
Table 1 
 
